Regulatory Legal Regime on the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information in Ethiopia by Enyew, Alebachew Birhanu
Regulatory Legal Regime on the Protection of Privacy and 
Personal Information in Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
 
Candidate number: 22 
Advisor: Dr. Lee Bygrave 
Deadline for submission: ….. (09/15/2009) 
 
Number of words: 15,076 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Master of Laws 
in Information and Communication Technology law, University of Oslo, 2009 
________________________________________________________________________
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
Faculty of Law 
 
 
Regulatory Legal Regime on the Protection of Privacy and Personal 
Information in Ethiopia 
 
 
Submitted by 
Alebachew B. Enyew 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for Masters Degree in 
Information and Communication Technology Law 
 
 
 
 
Advisor: Dr. Lee Bygrave 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law (NRCCL) 
Law Faculty 
University of Oslo 
September 2009  
 
 
 Acknowledgement 
 
Thanks to God for letting me go through this! I would like to extend my heart-felt 
gratitude to my advisor Dr. Lee Bygrave for his scholarly and constructive comments in 
the course of writing. I would also like to thank all people who have directly or indirectly 
made my stay in Oslo bearable. 
 
 
 
 
        Table of Content 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................ 3 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
1 THE BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ......................................................................................... 4 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 4 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
2 THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY ........................................................................................................ 8 
2.1 DEFINITION ................................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 PRIVACY AS A HUMAN RIGHT ...................................................................................................13 
2.3 LIMITATIONS OF PRIVACY ........................................................................................................17 
2.4 THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON PRIVACY ...........................................................................20 
2.5 THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY LAW ..........................................................................................22 
CHAPTER THREE.....................................................................................................................................27 
3 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION IN ETHIOPIA .......................27 
3.1 ICT IN ETHIOPIA AT GLANCE ...................................................................................................27 
3.2 PRIVACY LAWS ..........................................................................................................................29 
3.2.1 The FDRE Constitution........................................................................................................29 
3.2.2 Subsidiary laws .....................................................................................................................33 
3.2.2.1 Criminal Procedure law .......................................................................................................... 34 
3.2.2.2 Civil Law ................................................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.2.3 Mass Media Law ...................................................................................................................... 39 
3.3 INADEQUACY OF PRIVACY PROTECTION LAWS .......................................................................42 
CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................................................................44 
4 THE NEED FOR PRIVACY LAW ..................................................................................................44 
4.1 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ..................................................................................................44 
4.2 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE PROMOTION ...................................................................................46 
4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS REGULATION ...................................................................48 
 2 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................49 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Acronyms 
 
ECT-Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation 
ETA-Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency 
EU-European Union 
FDRE-Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
FEAC-Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
ICCPR-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICT-Information and Communication Technology 
OECD-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PET-Privacy Enhancing Technology 
UDHR-Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Chapter one 
1 The background of the study 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The right to privacy has been guaranteed in various human rights instruments, including 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as fundamental right. As a 
state party to the Covenant, Ethiopia has constitutionally given recognition to the right. 
Nonetheless, the country does not have a specific privacy law to enforce the 
constitutionally guaranteed right. However, one can still find privacy related provisions 
in various branch of laws of the country, mainly in the constitution itself, Criminal 
Procedure Code, Law of Extra-contractual liability and Mass Media law. In this thesis, 
we are going to focus on examining how and to what extent privacy right is protected 
within the existing legal framework of the country. 
 
Regardless of its constitutional guarantee and recognition under international human 
rights instruments, the right to privacy has been increasingly threatened owing to 
technological advancements. The global nature of the internet and the advancement of 
information technologies have enhanced the flow of information through out the world. 
Nowadays personal information can be collected and processed easily through the use of 
sophisticated means and implemented in various ways. The information appetite of both 
public and private sectors can also result in a wide and uncontrolled flow of information 
which can negatively affect the fundamental human rights and freedoms in particular the 
right to privacy. In short, recent developments can give rise to an inappropriate imbalance 
between the public interest for surveillance and the competing individual interest for 
privacy. And hence the flow of information has to be carefully scrutinized from personal 
data protection perspective.  
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Having known the ongoing situation, notably European countries and USA have begun to 
promulgate piece of legislation to protect personal information since 1970s. On the other 
hand, countries like Ethiopia have still tried to regulate privacy concerns by the virtue of 
the already existing law, without having specific law. Undeniably, the legal response of 
countries can be dependent upon their level of information and communication 
technology development. For instance, in most developing countries, information and 
communication technology is still lagging behind both in terms of quality and area of 
coverage. Such countries may take time to feel the repercussion of the new technology, 
and come up with the appropriate respective legal response. However, personal 
information could still be collected, processed and transferred even in those countries in 
which ICT is at the very early stage of development. Globalization and international trade 
have played a great role for the flow of personal data within and outside of those 
countries.  
 
This being so, the central aim of this thesis is to probe the legal protection accorded to 
privacy by the already existing law of Ethiopia. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
terminologies “privacy law” and “data protection law” are used interchangeably. Besides, 
privacy is intended to refer all aspects of the term (physical privacy, information privacy, 
communication privacy and territorial privacy). The thesis is divided into four chapters. 
The first chapter presents background of the study, statement of the problem, scope of the 
study, and the methodology. By so doing, the chapter is hoped to provide the skeleton of 
the thesis. In chapter two, it is sought to discuss the concept of privacy, the scope and 
limitation of privacy as a human rights. This chapter will try to touch upon the 
definitional difficulty of privacy and the problem of balancing countervailing interests 
against privacy. It will also unpack the impact information technologies on the notion of 
privacy and explicate the evolution of privacy laws. Chapter three will be devoted to 
canvass the legal framework of Ethiopia to protect privacy and personal information in 
light of information technologies development. This chapter will also examine whether 
the existing law provides sufficient protection for privacy. Finally, whether or not 
Ethiopia needs to have a codified privacy law will be dealt in chapter four. 
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1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
According to its Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy, the 
Ethiopian government has made the development of information and communication 
technology one of its strategic priorities as an industry and as an enabler of socio-
economic transformation. Even though, still in its infancy, ICT in Ethiopia has developed 
rapidly in recent years. Apart from the positive contribution, this technological 
development has, will have negative repercussion on the right to privacy if it is not 
regulated. The exploitation and application of ICT generally requires an appropriate legal 
and regulatory environment in every sphere including personal data protection. In spite of 
lack of codified privacy law to protect privacy and personal information in the country, 
one can find scattered privacy provisions in various branches of law. This being so, the 
writer is intending to address the following issues: what are the relevant provisions within 
the legal framework of Ethiopia to protect privacy and personal information? To what 
extent those provisions can protect privacy and personal information in light of ICT 
development?  Do they satisfy the requirement of the EU ‘adequacy test’ for 
transnational data flow? And does the country need to take measures to bring its privacy 
law in line with EU adequacy standards? 
 
1.3 Scope of the study 
 
The study is limited to unpack the most relevant privacy provisions within the legal 
framework of Ethiopia in light of the ICT development. Since Ethiopia does not have a 
comprehensive codified law (which can be applicable for the protection of privacy), the 
writer will try to identify the said provisions from different legislations, namely the 
constitution, law extra-contractual liability, criminal procedure code, mass media law and 
other branches of law of the country. In order to examine those provisions in light of 
privacy protections, a comparison will seldom be made with other jurisdictions’ privacy 
laws such as EU Data protection Directives and OECD Privacy Guidelines. For better 
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understanding of the notion of privacy, the study will also explicate the meaning and 
scope of privacy based on human rights instruments and academic literatures.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The study is methodologically designed to be carried out from the perspective of legal 
analysis. In respect to the application of primary source materials, international treaties, 
domestic laws and cases will be used. Secondary sources like books, journals and articles 
will also be consulted. Besides, policies, preparatory works, statements, declarations and 
soft laws will be taken in account to understand the historical and political context in the 
interpretation of laws if need be.  
 
Since there is no legal literature on the notion of privacy from information technologies 
perspective in Ethiopia, the study will mainly be carried out by consulting and analyzing 
the existing laws of the country. Bearing in mind that there could be a huge gap between 
Ethiopia as developing country and developed countries in various ways, the study will 
adopt a comparative approach if a need arises.  
 
The Ethiopian law belongs to the continental legal system, the primary feature of which 
is that laws are written into codified or systematically arranged document. Decision is 
given based on codified law concerning particular subject matter, not based on 
precedence. The statutes of Ethiopia have been written in Amharic (the working language 
of the federal government as per article 5(2) of the constitution) and English languages. 
In case of contradiction between the Amharic and English versions, the former has final 
legal authority. Each federal law has stipulated a provision to that effect.  In this study, 
the writer will use the English version of the law insofar as there is no discrepancy 
between the meanings of the law in the two languages.  
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Chapter Two 
2  The Concept of Privacy 
2.1  Definition 
 
This chapter primarily tends to explore the double challenge that the notion of privacy 
has been facing: lack of a satisfactory definition and difficulty in balancing privacy 
against countervailing values. The concept of privacy has been the subject of academic 
and public controversy for generations. Many literatures (be it legal or philosophical) tell 
us that there is no consensus on the meaning of privacy. The concept is too elusive to 
define it clearly and precisely. Many controversies regarding privacy are conceptual in 
nature which concern the meaning of privacy and analytic basis of distinguishing privacy 
right from other kinds of rights recognized within moral, political or legal theories.1
 
 
Concomitantly, other disagreements stems from the question of how to balance privacy 
rights against the rights and interests of others. 
Although defining privacy has proven to be quite complicated, and many commentators 
have expressed great difficulty in defining precisely what privacy is, many attempts have 
been made to define the concept. These attempts range from providing broad definition 
down to doubting privacy as a distinct concept. In this regard, there are two conceptual 
approaches which are known in literatures as anti-reductionism and reductionism.2
                                                 
1 Madison Powers, A Cognitive Access Definition of Privacy, Law and philosophy, vol.15, iss: 4, (1996) 
p.369. 
 
Proponents of anti-reductionism claim that a divers set of invasions or interferences with 
personal information, secrecy, repose, reserve, peace of mind, bodily integrity, 
2 Ibid p. 370. 
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anonymity, solitude, seclusion, sanctuary, intimacy or intimate relationships, and 
decisional autonomy should be understood under the generic heading of privacy.3
 
 
Advocates of reductionism do not accept the seemingly all inclusive conceptions of 
privacy saying that the more expansive conceptions of privacy are vague, ambiguous and 
indeterminate.4
 
 They assert that privacy can be reduced to other concepts and rights. In 
this connection, Judith J. Thomson contends that: 
there is nothing particularly distinctive about privacy and to talk about things as 
violating the ‘right to privacy’ is not all that useful. Privacy is a cluster of other 
rights such as the right to liberty, property right, and the right not to be injured. 
The ‘right to privacy’ is everywhere overlapped by other rights. Is there something 
distinctive about privacy? What does privacy capture that these other rights and 
interests (autonomy, property, liberty etc) do not?5
 
 
The quotation conveys that the conceptual distinctiveness of privacy is doubtful. The 
concept is regarded as parasitic in a sense that its protection can be secured by 
safeguarding other primary interests (property rights, human dignity, bodily integrity, 
preventing or compensating emotional distress, etc).6
 
 
As has been expounded above, the gulf of disagreement between the two approaches 
is huge, ranging from the extreme forms of anti-reductionism treating privacy as a 
large family of loosely related concepts without any common denominators, to the 
extreme version of reductionism advocating the elimination of privacy altogether on 
                                                 
3 Ibid p. 370-71. 
4 Ibid p.371. 
5 Daniel J. Solove and Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law, Aspen publishers, New York (2003), 
p.40. 
6 Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1989), p.18. 
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the ground that privacy is nothing but some other concept.7
 
 A wide range of 
intermediate views are possible as well. Various writers have defined the term privacy 
in their own ways. However, none of them has been able to provide a satisfactory and 
universally accepted definition. Any how, it may be helpful for further analysis of the 
concept to examine the suggested definitions at this juncture.  
According to Lee Bygrave, the definitions of privacy can be categorized into four 
major ways, albeit non-exhaustive.8 The first group of definitions views privacy in 
terms of non-interference, a definition attributed to Samual Warren and Louis 
Brandeis who saw privacy as “a right to be let alone.”9 Most literatures indicate that 
the conception of Warren and Brandeis has profoundly shaped the development of the 
law of privacy. However, such definitions have been criticized for being over 
inclusive without some clear criterion for deciding when interference counts as a loss 
of privacy. Critics further contend that there are innumerable ways of failing to let a 
person alone which arguably have nothing to do with privacy or its loss, for instance 
hitting someone over the head with a brick is a clear case of not letting someone alone, 
and yet it is not reasonable to view it as an interference with privacy.10
 
 
The second group of theorists conceives privacy a form of control over personal 
information. Put differently, privacy is the control an individual has over information 
about the self. Charles fried explains that privacy is not simply the absence of 
information about the self in the mind of others; rather it is the control over the 
knowledge about oneself.11
                                                 
7 Madison Powers , Supra note 1, P.371-72. 
 Alan Westin has also defined privacy as “claims of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine themselves when, how and to what 
8 Lee A.Bygrave, Data Protection law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, (2002), p. 128-29. 
9 Samual D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, No.5 
(1809), P.193-96. 
10 Madison Powers, Supra note 1,  p.374. 
11 Daniel J. Solove  and Marc Rotenberg, supra note 5,  p.31. 
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extent information about them is communicated to others.”12 Privacy is considered as 
an instrument for achieving individual goals of self-realization.13  At this juncture, one 
may wonder whether or not this is a compelling definition of privacy. Critics of 
information control theorists argue that the condition of privacy may be obtained 
without control, and that one might exercise control without having privacy.14 There is 
also uncertainty about the status of privacy whether it is a situation, a psychological 
state, a form of control, a right, a claim, or value. An assumption behind the rejection 
of information control definitions is that privacy can be defined as a condition or state 
of affairs such that it is possible to describe the changes in that condition which count 
as losses of privacy.15
 
 
The third group of definitions links privacy with intimacy. Some argue that intimacy 
appropriately defines what information or matters are private, for it is a common 
denominator in all the matters that people claim to be private.16 For example, Julie 
Inness explains  that privacy is the state of the agent having control over decisions 
(these decisions includes choices on the agent part about access to oneself, the 
dissemination of information about oneself, and one’s actions) concerning matters that 
draw their meaning and value from the agent’s love, caring, or liking.17 Like other 
ways of definitions, linking privacy closely to intimate or sensitive aspects of one’s 
life has suffered from criticism. The criticism springs from its failure to anticipate and 
capture the process by which detailed personal profiles are created.18
                                                 
12 Daniel Solove  and Marc Rotenberg, Supra note 5, p.28. 
  
13 Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ‘Code’ and the Slow Erosion of Privacy, 12 Mich. Telecom., Tech. 
L. Rev. 115 (2005), available at http://www.mttlr.org/voltwelve/koops and leenes.pdf, p.124. 
14 Madison Powers, Supra note 1, p.373. 
15 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, the Yale Law Journal, Vol.89, No.3, (1980), p. 425-27. 
16 Daniel Solove  and Marc Rotenberg, supra note 5,  p.32. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Lee Bygrave, Supra note 8, p.131. 
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The fourth group of theorists views privacy as a form of limited access to the self. 
Ruth Gavison has given an influential and multidimensional definition in this 
category. According to Gavison, our interest in privacy is related to our concern over 
our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others (secrecy), the 
extent which others have physical access to us (solitude), and the extent to which we 
are the subject of others’ attention (anonymity).19 She argues that the three forms of 
privacy are independent, irreducible and distinct in the sense that a loss of privacy may 
occur through a change in any one of the three, without a necessary loss in either of 
the other two.20 According to her, the concept is coherent because the three elements 
are all part of the same notion of accessibility, and are related in many important ways. 
Advocates of reductionism objected her on the ground that the two elements (secrecy 
and anonymity) can be reduced into one, and thus they are not distinct senses of 
privacy.21
 
  
Such a diversity of definitions tells us the battle over the concept of privacy seems to 
continue unabated. The problem of the definition by no stretch of imagination implies 
that the concept lacks importance. The quest and need for privacy is a natural one. In 
fact, the absence of a uniform definition of privacy may not always be a weakness, for 
it provides room for flexibility in its implementation and for balancing the amorphous 
concept with large counter claim.22  And yet the prospects for its satisfactory legal 
recognition and application are bound to be poor unless the concept is sufficiently 
distinctive to facilitate coherent analytical identification and description.23
 
 
                                                 
19  Ruth Gavison, Supra note 15, p.423. 
20 Ibid p.428. 
21 Madison Powers, supra note 1,  p. 383. 
22 Lee Bygrave, Supra note 8, p. 127. 
23 Raymond Wacks, Supra note 6,  p.19. 
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As discussed, privacy is defined differently by various scholars: as a right to be let 
alone, control over information, intimacy and limited access to the self.  It is of the 
opinion of this writer that the definition of privacy should not be confined to one 
aspect of the notion. To put differently, the definition should be broad enough to cover 
the essence of the concept or the multidimensional aspects of privacy. According to 
David Banisar there are the following four separate but related aspects of privacy. 
 
Information privacy:  which involves the establishment of rules governing the 
collection and handling of personal data such as credit information, and medical 
and government records. It is also known as "data protection";  
Bodily privacy: which concerns the protection of people's physical selves against 
invasive procedures such as genetic tests, drug testing and cavity searches;  
Privacy of communications: which covers the security and privacy of mail, 
telephones, e-mail and other forms of communication; and  
Territorial privacy: which concerns the setting of limits on intrusion into the 
domestic and other environments such as the workplace or public space. This 
includes searches, video surveillance and ID checks.24
 
 
For example, informational control definition seems to this writer that it overlooks two or 
more aspects of privacy. The concept of privacy should be understood to refer the 
aforementioned dimensions. In being multidimensional, this writer finds that Ruth 
Gavison’s definition is the most compelling to be upheld. 
 
2.2 Privacy as a Human Right 
 
Modern international human rights law is a post World War II phenomenon since its 
development can be attributed to the monstrous human rights violations during the war.25
                                                 
24 David Banisar, Privacy and Human Rights, Electronic Privacy Information Centre, Washington, DC, 
(2000), p.3. 
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With the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the international community pursued 
a goal of “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”26
 
 In this respect, 
the first remarkable step taken by the UN was the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948. The Declaration has 
become to be recognized as a common standard for all peoples and nations towards the 
promotion human dignity. The standard setting gave way to the promulgation of legally 
binding international human rights instruments of the 1966: the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These 
instruments are subsequently supplemented by various conventions dealing with specific 
human rights violations. 
Privacy is internationally recognized as a fundamental human right under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (article 12), the International Covenant on Civil and political 
Rights (ICCPR article 17), the UN Convention on Migrant Workers (article 14), and the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Child (article 16). These international human rights 
documents have embodied privacy in more or less the same wording. For instance, Article 
17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: “no one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” According to the 
Human Rights Committee, this right is required to be guaranteed against all such 
interferences and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or 
legal persons27
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Thomas Buergenthal et.al. International Human Rights Law in a nutshell, 3rd ed., west Group, (2004), 
p.27. 
. State parties are required to adopt legislative and other measures to give 
26 Charter of the United Nations, (26 June, 1947), chapter I, art.1, Para. 3. 
27 The Human Rights Committee General Comment No.16, The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home 
and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, UN Doc. HRC/08/04/88 (1988), Para. 1. 
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effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of 
this right.28
 
  
Article 17(1) has four elements: privacy, family, home, and correspondence. The term 
privacy in the heading and privacy in the wording of this article are different in their scope. 
The former is broad enough to consist of the four elements whereas the latter is to mean 
private life in the narrow sense. Privacy in the narrow sense includes all manifestations of 
privacy that do not fall under other categories: family, home and correspondence. Private 
life includes autonomy, physical and moral integrity, the right to determine personal identity 
(including sexual identity) and sexual orientation and relations.29 Regarding the term family, 
the Human Rights Committee has stressed that the objectives of the Covenant require a 
broad interpretation of the family in the sense of the respective cultural understanding of the 
various State Parties.30
 
 In its General Comment No.16 paragraph 5, the Committee has also 
noted that home has to be understood to indicate a place where a person resides or carries 
out his usual occupation. Finally, communication under article 17(1) covers a wide range of 
communications including post, telephone, telex, fax, and email. 
Furthermore, regional human rights instruments (save African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) have expressly given recognition to privacy as one of the fundamental 
rights in human rights catalogue. Although the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights does not explicitly say anything about the right to privacy, this writer believes that 
some aspect of privacy is impliedly enshrined in it when the Charter stipulates that “every 
individual shall have the right to respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the 
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
                                                 
28 General Assembly Res. 2200(XXI) of 16 December 1966, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 17(2). 
29 Manfred Nowak, UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, N.P. Engel, 
publisher  Kehl, Strasbourg, Arlington, (1993), p.294-98. 
See also Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Blackstone Press Limited, 
(2001), p.150 
30 The Human Rights Committee General Comment No.16, supra note 27, Para. 5. 
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slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall 
be prohibited.” 31
 
 In Africa, there is little development towards privacy laws despite the fact 
that almost all African countries have ratified the ICCPR. The possible reason may relate to 
the lack of technological advancements, political and cultural differences. Some people 
might think of privacy as no more than a luxury for the better-off in developed countries. 
In the Inter-American human rights system, the right to privacy has been embodied in the 
1948 the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. This regional declaration 
has been reinforced by the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969. Article 11 of 
this Convention envisages: 
 
(1)Every one has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 
(2)No one may be the subject of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private 
life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his 
honor or reputation.(3)Every one has the right to protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks. 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights sets out the right to privacy in similar 
terms (save sub article 1) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
 
The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms has also enshrined the right to privacy in different formulation and content 
as compared to the above discussed human rights instruments. The difference lies on 
the qualifications made in sub article 2 of article 8 of the Convention. Article 8 of this 
Convention reads: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private life and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority 
                                                 
31 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (1981), article 5. 
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with the exercise of this right except as in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health of morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Like the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this article protects four different 
interests (private and family life, home and correspondence) which embrace a variety 
of matters, some of which are connected one another, some of which overlap with 
others.32
 
 The first paragraph defines protected right, the second lays down the 
condition upon which a state might legitimately interfere with the enjoyment of the 
right. In other words, the European Convention expressly stipulates the competing 
interests protected and limitations. So far we have seen how the right to privacy is 
incorporated in the international and regional human rights instruments. Like most 
human rights, the right to privacy is not an absolute one. It has its own limitations. 
Now we are going to comment on the limitations of the right to privacy. 
2.3 Limitations of Privacy 
 
According to international human rights law, countries can generally limit or restrict the 
scope of obligations in different ways: express limitations to the rights, derogations from 
the rights, and reservations to treaties. In this section, we are not interested in discussing 
derogations and reservations. Rather we are going to probe the limitations to the right of 
privacy. A restriction of rights is stipulated in human rights documents in order to strike a 
balance between competing interests/values.  
 
                                                 
32 DJ Harris, M O’Boyle and C Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworth, 
London, (1995), P.302. 
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As discussed, the right to privacy is guaranteed in the UDHR, ICCPR and the American 
and European human rights system. Of these human rights instruments, the European 
Convention on Human Rights has explicitly provided an exception to the right to privacy.  
To the contrary, as one can understand from the cursory reading of article 17 of the 
ICCPR, there is no express legal proviso allowing for restriction in the interest of public 
or similar purposes. Nonetheless, one can logically infer the existence of permissible 
interference with privacy from the phrases “arbitrary or unlawful interference.”  
However, the terms arbitrary and unlawful are in need of interpretation. According to the 
Human Rights Committee, the term unlawful means no interference except in cases 
envisaged by law, and the introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to 
guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the 
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable 
in the particular circumstances.33
 
 The converse reading of article 17(1) reveals that 
interference with the privacy, family, home and correspondence is permissible so long as 
the interference is neither unlawful nor arbitrary. And hence limitation of the right for the 
sake of other interests is permitted insofar as such limitation is made lawfully and 
reasonably. There is no wrong to restrict right to privacy in accordance with the law and 
in a reasonable manner. The essence of each restriction is that the interest of the society 
as whole overrides the interest of individuals.  
By the same token, under the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to 
privacy can be limited where certain qualifying conditions are satisfied. Those conditions 
(under which limitations are permissible) are clearly envisaged under article 8 (2) of the 
Convention. As per paragraph 2 of article 8 of the Convention, limitations are allowed if 
they are in accordance with the law and are necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of one of objectives set out therein. In order to strike a balance between human 
rights enshrined in the Convention from articles 8-11 and their respective limitations, the 
European Court of Human Rights has used the same criteria: whether the interference is 
prescribed by the law, whether the interference pursues a legitimate aim, and whether the 
                                                 
33 Human Right Committee General Comment No.16, Supra note 27, para.3-4. 
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interference is necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.34 These criteria have been advanced and made clear by decision of the Court at 
Strasbourg.35
 
  Therefore, any countervailing values/interests against the right to privacy 
will be examined based on those criteria at least in Europe.  
The European Court of Human Rights has been using the “balancing test” based on those 
criteria to lawfully justify the limitations to the right of privacy. One the other hand, in 
the U.S context, the test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” has been introduced in 
case law to canvass whether there is a breach of privacy.36 Actually, the transatlantic 
difference regarding privacy is not only limited to using different parameters to offset 
other values against privacy, but there is also a divergence of view on value protected by 
privacy: liberty or dignity? The cleavage between ‘libertarian’ and ‘dignitarian’ is 
considered as a reflection of the underlying neo-liberal and social democratic theories of 
human rights.37
 
 The transatlantic clash on privacy is described: 
Privacy protections in Europe are, at their core, a form of protection of a right to 
respect and personal dignity…By contrast, America, in this as in so many things, is 
much more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against the 
state. At its conceptual core, the American right to privacy still takes much the form 
that it took in the eighteenth century: it is the right to freedom from intrusions by 
the state, especially in one’s own home.38
 
 
                                                 
34 Francis G. Jacobs and Robin C.A. White, the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University 
press, 4th ed, (2006), p.223-40. 
35 See Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14,  Silver et.al. v United Kingdom (1983) 5EHRR 347, 
and Salov v. Ukraine, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, (2005).  
36 Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, supra note 13, p.128. 
37 Katja S. Ziegler, Human Rights and Private Law-Privacy as Autonomy, Oxford and Portland, Hart 
Publishing, (2007), p.1-2. 
38 James Q. Whiteman, the Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, Yale Law Journal, 
Vol.113, (2004), p.1151. 
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2.4 The Impact of Technology on Privacy 
 
We live in a society in which information technology is accelerating rapidly. Because 
of the technology there has been steady growth in the use and manipulation of vast 
quantities and varieties of personal data. Extensive details concerning the most trivial 
actions undertaken are recorded. This offers almost unlimited possibilities to facilitate 
surveillance and monitoring, thereby invading privacy.39As the information based 
societies have gradually become more dependent on computers and new technologies 
of communication, privacy has been at stake more than ever. Audio and video 
surveillance technologies, identification and tracking technologies, data processing 
technologies, internet and computer technologies (privacy invasive technologies) have 
been offering many new opportunities for capturing and processing data. While the 
growth of information technologies is critical to governments, public services, 
business, and the livelihood of many individuals, it can also facilitate unobtrusive 
access to, manipulation of, and presentation of private data of individuals.40 In this 
regard, one commentator pointed out the seriousness of the matter when he said: both 
government and business are using information technologies to monitor individuals 
“to a degree that no keystroke goes uncounted, and no pause for breath goes 
unmetered.”41 Wherever we go, whatever we do, we could easily leave behind a trail 
of data that is recorded and gathered together.42
 
 And hence, the information 
technologies have created a big forum for them to pry deeper into the personal sphere, 
often invisibly and from a safe distance. 
                                                 
39 Bert J. Koops and Ronald Leenes, supra note 13 p. 118. 
40 Victoria Bellotti, Design for Privacy in Multimedia Computing and Communications Environments, in  
Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy: the New Landscape, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, (1998), p.64. 
41 David Brin, Transparent Society-Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?, 
Addison-Wesely, Reading/Massachusetts, (1998), p.81. 
42 Daniel Solove and Marc Rotenberg, Supra note 5, p.1. 
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Privacy erosion is the counter product of the rapid growth of information and 
communication technology. In relation to the impact of the information technologies on 
privacy, it was said that:  
 
one of the less welcoming consequences of the information technology revolution 
has been the ease with which it has become possible to invade the privacy of the 
individual. No longer is it necessary to peep through keyholes or listen under the 
eaves. Instead, more reliable information can be obtained in greater comfort and 
safety by using the concealed surveillance camera, the telephoto lens, the hidden 
microphone and telephone bug. No longer is it necessary to open letters, pry into 
files or conduct elaborate inquiries to discover the intimate details of person’s 
business or financial affairs, his health, family, leisure interests or dealings with 
central or local government. Vast amounts of information about everyone are 
stored on computers, capable of instant transmission anywhere in the world and 
accessible at the touch of a keyboard. The right to keep oneself to oneself, to tell 
other people that certain things are none of their business, is under technological 
threat.43
 
 
According to David Banisar, along with technological advancements there are three 
important trends that contribute to the erosion of privacy: globalization (which 
removes geographical limitations to the flow of data-internet), convergence (which 
leads to the elimination of technological barriers between systems for interoperability) 
and multimedia (which fuses many forms of transmission and expression of data and 
images so that information gathered in a certain form can be easily translated into 
other forms).44
 
 
 The increasing sophistication of information and communication technologies, 
coupled with the increasing use of personal information by business and government, 
                                                 
43 Ian J. Lioyd, Information Technology Law, Oxford University press, 4th ed., (2004), p.52 
44 David Banisar, Supra note 24, p.18 
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has posed great challenges for the protection of privacy. However, it is equally good to 
remember that technologies are not always privacy invasive. In fact, there are some 
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) like encryption and anonymizing technologies. 
But still information technologies are more privacy invasive than privacy enhancing. 
The growing dependency of the society on novel and constantly evolving technologies 
has introduced a sense of urgency to the demand for the legal applications and 
implications of these new technologies. In the next section, we are going to elucidate 
the evolution of privacy laws.  
 
2.5 The Evolution of Privacy Law 
 
As discussed in the forgoing section, there have been rapid information technology 
developments which in turn spawn the growth in the amount of data stored and the 
data-sharing along organizational and national boundaries. Concerns about the 
potential effect of automatic data processing upon the right to privacy began to grow 
during the late 1960s and the early 1970s with the advent of information technology.45 
These concerns about the possible use and misuse of data through sophisticated 
technologies gave rise to a growing call for legislative intervention. In response to this 
call, US has exhibited a propensity to enact a range of statutes to regulate specific 
forms of information handling (sectoral approach), whereas a different approach has 
prevailed within Europe in which the tendency has been to enact omnibus data 
protection statutes (comprehensive laws) to regulate almost all instances regarding 
personal data.46
                                                 
45 James Michael, Privacy and Human Rights: an International and Comparative Study, with Special 
Reference to Developments in Information Technology, Dartmouth, UNESCO Publishing, (1994), p. 32. 
 So the development of privacy law in United States is typically 
described as sectoral in a sense that privacy legislation focuses on specific sectors of 
the economy, while European privacy law is often characterized as omnibus, for it is 
generally applied to all entities that collect personally identifiable information 
46 Ian Lioyd, Supra note 43, p.61. 
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regardless of the nature of the business or the technology involved.47 Beyond the 
comprehensive and sectroral laws, there are two more approaches for privacy 
protection which can be complementary or contradictory depending on their 
application.48 One of the approaches is self-regulation. At least theoretically privacy 
protection can be achieved through various forms of regulation, in which companies 
and industry bodies establish codes of practice and engage in self policing, thereby 
enabling data subjects and other entities to enforce the codes against themselves.49 
Self regulation, which is currently the policy promoted by USA, Japan and Singapore, 
has tended to provide only weak protections and lack enforcement.50 The other 
approach is using privacy enhancing technologies. Individuals and institutions have 
sought to develop cryptographic techniques of data protection that provide varying 
degrees of privacy and security of communications.51
 
 
Beyond Europe and USA, other countries are also moving toward adopting privacy 
laws. According to David Banisar, there are three major reasons for the movement 
towards comprehensive privacy laws. These are: 
 
To remedy past injustices- many countries, especially in Central Europe, South 
America and South Africa, are adopting laws to remedy privacy violations that 
occurred under previous authoritarian regimes. 
To promote electronic commerce- many countries, especially in Asia, have 
developed or are currently developing laws in an effort to promote electronic 
commerce. These countries recognize consumers are uneasy with their personal 
                                                 
47 Daniel Solove and Marc Rotenberg, Supra note 5, p.687. 
48 David Banisar, Supra note 24, p.3. 
49 David Bender and Larry Ponemon, Binding Corporate Rules for Cross-Border Data Transfer, Rutgers 
Journal of Law and Urban Policy, Vol.3:2, (2006), p.161. 
50 David Baisar, Supra note 24, p. 4. 
51 David J.Phillips, Cryptography, Secrets, and Structuring of Trust, in Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg, 
Technology and Privacy: the New Landscape, Cambridge, The MIT Press, (1998), p243. 
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information being sent worldwide. Privacy laws are being introduced as part of a 
package of laws intended to facilitate electronic commerce by setting up uniform 
rules. 
To ensure laws are consistent with pan-European laws- most countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe are adopting new laws based on the Council of Europe 
Convention and the European Union Data Protection Directive. Many countries 
hope to join the European Union in the near future. Countries in other regions, 
such as Canada, are adopting new laws to ensure that trade will not be affected by 
the requirements of the EU Directive.52
 
 
 The origin of modern privacy laws (commonly known data protection laws in Europe) 
can be traced to the first data protection law in the world enacted in the state of Hesse 
in Germany in 1970, with the first national statute being the Swedish Data Protection 
Act 1973.53 Indeed, it was inevitable, as society increasingly dependent on novel and 
constantly evolving technologies, that the legislatures would be compelled to enact 
laws in order to regulate the new situation. According to Bygrave, there are three 
important catalysts for the emergency of data protection laws, which can be termed 
technological and institutional developments, public fears about these developments, 
and legal factors54
 
  
As has been said in section 2.2, the formal normative source of privacy laws derives 
from human rights instruments, mainly from Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on Child Rights, 
Convention on Migrant Workers, and the two regional (European and American) 
human rights instruments. These human rights instruments have firmly established 
privacy protection as fundamental human rights claim, and thereby shaped privacy 
laws. Although the first privacy laws were enacted at national level, there had been 
                                                 
52 David Banisar, Supra note 24, P.9. 
53 Ian Lioyd, Supra note 43, p.62. 
54 Lee Bygrave,Supra note 8,  p.93. 
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international data protection initiatives pursued within the Council of Europe and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).55 These 
initiatives resulted in the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Convention on data 
protection and the OECD Guidelines. The former came into effect in 1985, and is now 
legally binding among the member states, whereas the latter is not in the language of 
obligation, rather recommendation. The Council’s Convention has established basic 
rules for data protection measures to be adopted by adhering states, and has set out 
special rules about trans-border data flows.56 The 1980 OECD guidelines, which carry 
heavy political and economical weight, have also stipulated the fundamental principles 
for personal data protection.57 The privacy guidelines of OECD represent a consensus 
position of countries from North America, Europe, and East Asia as to the basic 
structure of privacy law. Beyond this, there are guidelines at the United Nations level 
regarding Computerized Personal Data Files which are intended to encourage 
enactment of privacy laws in UN member states, and to encourage international 
organization to process personal data in a responsible, fair and privacy-friendly 
manner.58
 
 
In Europe, apart from the Council of Europe’s Convention on Data Protection, the 
1995 EU Data Protection Directive is the central focus of European Privacy law. The 
EU Data Protection Directive has had a profound effect on the development of privacy 
law, not only in Europe but also around the world.59
                                                 
55 Ian Lioyd, supra note 43, p.62-63. 
 The importance of this Directive 
stems from its status as a legally binding instrument. Beyond the Directive, the 
56 Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data, European Treaty Series No. 108, /1981), articles 5 & 12. 
57 Lee A. Bygrave, Privacy Protection in a Global Context- A Comparative Overview, in Peter 
Wahlgren(ed.), IT law, Scandinavian Studies in Law Vol.47, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law,( 
2004) p.334. 
58   Ibid, p.335. 
59 Daniel Solove and Marc Rotenberg, Supra note 5, p.688. 
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European Court of Human Rights has also played a great role for the development of 
privacy laws by giving a binding decision pursuant to article 8 of the European human 
rights convention. 
 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) privacy 
guidelines set out eight key principles for the protection of personal data which have 
shaped national privacy laws around the globe. These basic principles for personal 
data protection are summed up in terms of collection limitation, purpose specification, 
information quality, individual participation, use limitation, information security 
safeguards, openness and accountability.60
 
 The Council of Europe Convention on 
privacy protection has much in common with the Guidelines. It is also a truism in EU 
Data Protection Directive even though the last two basic principles are not included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder flows of Personal Data, (1980), articles 
7-14. 
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Chapter Three 
3 The Legal Framework for Privacy Protection in Ethiopia 
3.1  ICT in Ethiopia at Glance 
 
Before we proceed to probe the privacy law of Ethiopia, it is very important at this point 
to give an overview about the status of information and communication in the country, 
for information technology has a great impact on privacy. The introduction of 
telecommunication in Ethiopia dates back to 1894.61 Established over a century ago, the 
Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) is the oldest public telecommunication 
operator in Africa. ETC operates as a public enterprise under the supervision of the 
Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency (ETA)62, with the principal duty of maintaining 
and expanding telecommunication services in the country and providing domestic and 
international telephone, telex, facsimile, telegraph and other communication services. In 
this respect, ETC has been made the “sole telecommunication service (including the 
provision of internet service) provider.”63
 
 Despite the recent liberalization and 
privatization measures in different sectors, the telecommunication industry has remained 
under the control of the government. So ETC is the incumbent public telecommunication 
operator and has a monopoly over all telecommunication services in the country (fixed, 
mobile, internet and other communication services). 
                                                 
61 Access on June 24, 2009, Ethiopian Telecommunication web site 
http://www.telecom.net.et/aboutETC/history.html. 
62 Proclamation No.49/1996, A proclamation to Provide for the Regulation of Telecommunications, Negarit 
Gazeta, (1996), article 3 and 6. 
63 Proclamation No. 281/2002, A Proclamation to Provide for the Amendment of Telecommunication 
Proclamation, Negarit Gazeta (2002), article 2(1). 
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In 1993, the use of the internet was introduced in Ethiopia when the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa (whose head quarter is in Addis Ababa) established a store-and-
forward email service called PADISNet (Pan African Documentation and Information 
Service Network).64 The introduction of the internet has increased access to the global 
knowledge resources. Especially since 1997 it has been observed considerable growth of 
information technology use in Ethiopia - proliferation of private companies that provide 
value added services in information technology, training centers and the establishment of 
a computer science unit in Universities, efforts towards standardizing Ethiopic software, 
etc.65
 
 Concomitantly, infrastructure is being put in place in various line ministries and 
regional states through funds from development assistance. Given the wide range of 
needs and enormous poverty, efforts to date are virtually insignificant. 
As a developing country, Ethiopia has taken many efforts to improve the existing socio-
economic conditions. ICT is believed to provide opportunities to support in the 
sustainable development of the socio-economic conditions, thereby enabling poverty 
eradication. The country has considered ICT as a major enabler of developmental efforts. 
This being so, the National ICT Policy was formulated in 2001. The National ICT Policy 
is a comprehensive document that articulates policy guidelines and describes critical 
areas for the development of ICT in Ethiopia. The strategic focus areas of this document 
include, among other things, the legal and regulatory environment. However, E-
commerce related laws and regulations such as privacy protection and digital signature 
have yet to be promulgated. For the purpose of the thesis, we are going to examine as to 
how privacy is protected within the purview of the Ethiopian legal system. Therefore, the 
following sections are devoted to discuss the legal regimes of Ethiopia which are capable 
of protecting privacy right.  
 
                                                 
64 International Telecommunication Union, Internet from the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia case study, Geneva 
(2002), p.18. 
65 Lishan Adam, Information and Communication in Ethiopia: Past, Present and Future Potential for Social 
and Economic Development, Ethiopian Information Technology Professional Association Workshop, 
Addis Ababa, (1999). 
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3.2 Privacy laws 
3.2.1 The FDRE Constitution 
 
As pointed out in section 2.2, privacy is a fundamental human right recognized in 
most major international treaties and agreements on human rights. Moreover, the 
constitutions of most countries of the world guarantee this right. So does the Ethiopian 
constitution. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereinafter FDRE) 
Constitution consists of a comprehensive bill of rights including civil, political, 
economical, social and cultural rights as well as the right to development and 
environmental rights. Almost one-thirds of the constitution is devoted to human rights 
(chapter three of the constitution, articles 13-44). In respect of privacy, Article 26 of 
the constitution guarantees the right in the following terms: 
1. Everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be 
subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any 
property under his personal possession. 
2. Everyone has the right to inviolability of his notes and correspondence 
including postal letters, and communications made by means of telephone, 
telecommunications and electronic devices. 
3. Public officials shall respect and protect these rights. No restrictions may be 
placed on the enjoyment of such rights except in compelling circumstances and 
in accordance with specific laws whose purposes shall be the safeguarding of 
national security or public peace, the prevention of crimes or the protection of 
health, public morality or the rights and freedoms of others. 
The FDRE constitution further provides: “All international agreements ratified by 
Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land”, and that: “The fundamental rights 
and freedoms specified in this chapter [chapter 3 of the constitution on fundamental 
rights and freedoms] shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Human Rights 
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and international instruments adopted by Ethiopia.”66 Accordingly, as Ethiopia is a 
party to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 17 of the Covenant should 
be deemed to be an integral part of the privacy law of the country. And if the privacy 
provision of the constitution is vague, ambiguous or needs interpretation, it will be 
construed in light of article 12 of UDHR and article 17 of ICCPR. However, 
individuals are not entitled to communicate human rights violations to the Human 
Rights Committee, since Ethiopia has yet to ratify the first optional protocol of the 
ICCPR.67
As we can understand from the cursory reading of article 26 of the FDRE constitution, 
the right to privacy of the individual is defined in terms of one’s person, home and 
property. The right to inviolability of one’s correspondence and communication with 
others is also made part and parcel of the right to privacy. And yet this article does not 
seem exhaustive about what the right to privacy consists of. It simply puts indicative 
list by giving examples. Article 26 the constitution and article 17 of the ICCPR are 
different in their wording in sense that the former prohibits searches of one’s home, 
person or property, and seizure of one’s property whereas the latter prohibits the 
unlawful or arbitrary interference with private life, home, family and correspondence. 
It seems to this writer that unlawful or arbitrary interference is broader than unlawful 
or arbitrary searches and seizures. Unlike the ICCPR and UDHR, the constitution has 
extended privacy protection to property under one’s personal possession; it is silent 
about protection of family though. Nonetheless, it is still possible to argue the element 
 
                                                 
66 Proclamation No. 1/1995, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Negarit 
Gazeta, (1995), Articles 9(4) and 13(2).  
67 The First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted in 
1966 by the UN General Assembly in order to establish internationally an individual complaint mechanism 
for the ICCPR. According to article 1 of the Protocol, state parties have agreed to recognize the competence 
of the UN Human Rights Committee to consider complaints from individuals who claim their rights under 
the Covenant have been violated. To take the case to the Committee, complainants must have exhausted all 
domestic remedies, and complaints should not be anonymous. The Committee must bring complaints to the 
attention of the relevant party, which must respond within six months. Following consideration, the 
Committee must forward its conclusions/views to the party and the complainant. However, its conclusion 
won’t have a binding effect. See articles 2-5 of the protocol. 
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family is protected within the purview of privacy in Ethiopia for two reasons: first, the 
list of protected elements under article 26 is open-ended to include family; second the 
ICCPR is the integral part of the law of the country by the virtue of article 9(4) of the 
constitution. 
Despite the otherwise argument of the Human Rights Committee, the obligation owed 
to the right to privacy under ICCPR has traditionally been viewed as an obligation to 
abstain from arbitrary or unlawful interferences with the right. This obligation of 
negative kind stems from the wording of the article 17 which does not expressly 
impose positive obligation as well on adherent states. In this regard, even the 
European Human Rights Convention seems to impose negative obligation. In 
particular, if we see the language of article 8(2) of the European Human Rights 
Convention (“there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right…”), the obligations on state parties appears a negative one, the right to be 
left alone by public authority. However, the European Court of Human Rights has not 
perceived the right to privacy in wholly negative terms; instead it has expanded the 
duties to positive obligation by using the wording ‘respect for’ under article 8(1).68
The right to privacy in the constitution is not unfettered right. It may be limited by 
rights of others and interests of the society. However, the mere benefit of others and 
general welfare should not be enough to justify an infringement as limitation of the 
right.
 As 
opposed to this, the first limb of article 26 (3) of the FDRE constitution solves such 
ambiguity when it explicitly says “public officials shall respect and protect [the right 
to privacy].” This sub article conveys that public officials are required not only to 
refrain themselves from interferences with individual privacy, but also to prevent 
private persons or entities that would impair the right. 
69
                                                 
68 D J Harris, M O’Boyle and C Warbrick, supra note 32, p. 303. 
 Pursuant to article 26(3) of the FDRE constitution, limitations to the right are 
permissible under the fulfillment of certain cumulative requirements. Limitation to the 
69 Rakebe Messele, Enforcement of Human Rights in Ethiopia, unpublished, Addis Ababa, (2002), p.13. 
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right to privacy is allowed only when the three important elements are satisfied 
together. These are: (1) there must be compelling circumstances; (2) interference must 
be in accordance with specific laws; and (3) there must be legitimate aims. Under 
article 26(3) of the FDRE constitution, six legitimate objectives are enumerated: 
national security, public peace, the prevention of crimes, the protection of health, 
public morality, and the rights and freedoms of others). National security is an 
amorphous concept at the core of which lies the survival of the state, whereas public 
safety, the prevention of crime, the protection of health, and public morality reflect 
society’s interest from different angles.70 The constitutional requirements set to limit 
privacy right are more or less similar to the requirements stipulated in the European 
Convention for Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The only difference 
is that the constitution puts the requirement of “compelling circumstances” in lieu of 
the requirement of “necessary in the democratic society.” 71
Whether or not an interference with privacy is justifiable based on the constitution, the 
three issues (is there a compelling circumstance to interfere? is the interference based 
on a specific law? and is the interference for one of the purposes set out in sub article 
3?) are sine quo non elements to be addressed. The parameter of “compelling 
circumstances” may be difficult to define it in the abstract. In any event, the prevailing 
situation should appear compelling to a reasonable degree to interfere with the right to 
privacy for one of the legitimate aims. It is also important to consider to what extent 
the compelling situation limits the right, test of proportionality. And the limitation 
should be by the virtue of specific law which can be laid down for the purpose of 
safeguarding national security or public peace, the prevention of crimes or the 
protection of health, public morality or the rights and freedoms of others. In such 
situations, the privacy right may be overridden by other values/ public interests.  
 
                                                 
70 Fasil Nahum, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: the Ethiopian Prospect, Lawrenceville N.J., Red Sea 
Press, (1997), p. 124. 
71 Article 26(3) of the FDRE Constitution and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, (1950), article 8(2).  
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Succinctly, interference with privacy right is permissible upon the fulfillment of the 
aforementioned requirements. Any limitation other than the constitutionally stipulated 
ones is by no means permissible, and is tantamount to constitutional violation. In this 
connection, article 9(1) of the constitution is very relevant when it declares that “the 
constitution is the supreme law of the land; and any law, customary practice or a 
decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes this constitution 
shall be of no effect.” According to Articles 62 and 83 of the FDRE constitution, the 
power to interpret the constitution and decide constitutional dispute is given to the 
second chamber, the House Federation. Unlike second chamber of other federations, 
House of Federation has no or little law-making functions; instead it reviews the 
constitutionality of laws.72 This is to say the House Federation can strike any 
governmental legislation down on the ground that the legislation breaches the 
constitution.73
3.2.2 Subsidiary laws 
 Therefore, any law or decision of government officials which goes 
against the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy will be rendered null and void. 
In the foregoing section, we have tried to unpack privacy protection at the 
constitutional level. Normally, constitution of any country consists of general 
                                                 
72 Assefa Fiseha, Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring the Experience of the House of 
Federation (HoF), a paper presented at African Network of Constitutional Law Conference on Fostering 
Constitutionalism in Africa, Nairobi, (2007), p.9. 
73 Ethiopia has structurally a bicameral parliament, but functionally a unicameral since the upper house 
(House of Federation) does not involve in law making process. Instead it is empowered to interpret the 
constitution and decide constitutional disputes. The House of Federation is assisted by an expert body 
called ‘Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI)’, which examines each case upon which constitutional 
interpretation is requested and submits its recommendations to the House, which then makes a final binding 
decision upon cases (Articles 82-84 of the FDRE constitution). The rationale for vesting power of 
constitutional interpretation in the House of Federation and not in the regular judiciary is that the 
constitution is considered as the reflection of the ‘free will’ and ‘consent’ of nationalities, and therefore the 
nationalities should be the ones to be vested that power. To this effect, House of Federation, which is 
composed of the representatives of “nations, nationalities and peoples” of Ethiopia pursuant to article 61(1) 
of the constitution, is granted the power to review the constitutionality of laws. Constitutional interpretation 
in Ethiopia is not purely a legal matter, for it is given for a political body believing that the constitution is 
mainly a political document. See also Assefa Fiseha, Ibid, p. 9-10. 
 34 
provisions dealing about government structures or organs and their respective powers, 
and human rights. These constitutionally framed provisions needs subsidiary specific 
laws for their proper implementation before court of law. Although the right to privacy 
is guaranteed in the FDRE constitution, Ethiopia does not have still a codified 
legislation on privacy protection. However, apart from the constitution, one can find 
scattered privacy provisions in Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Code, and Freedom of 
Mass Media & Access to Information Proclamation. In this particular section, we are 
going to discuss what privacy protections are provided by the existing array of laws. 
To this effect, privacy related provisions in various branches of law will be under our 
scrutiny.  
 
3.2.2.1  Criminal Procedure law 
 
As has been pointed out earlier, privacy may be limited in accordance with a specific 
law under compelling circumstances for legitimate aims. Crime prevention is one of 
the grounds by which the law enforcer can interfere with the privacy of individuals. 
However, the police officer can not interfere with individuals’ privacy arbitrarily 
under the guise of law enforcement.  In this respect, the 1957 Criminal Procedure 
Code of Ethiopia provides:  
Art. 32. - Searches and seizures. 
 Any investigating police officer or member of the police may make searches or 
seizures in accordance with the provisions which follow: (1) No arrested person 
shall be searched except where it is reasonably suspected that he has about his 
person any articles which may be material as evidence in respect of the offence 
with which he is accused or is suspected to have committed. A search shall be made 
by a person of the same sex as the arrested person. (2) No premises may be 
searched unless the police officer or member of the police is in possession of a 
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search warrant in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule to this Code except 
where: (a) an offender is followed in hot pursuit and enters premises or disposes of 
articles the subject matter of an offence in premises ;(b) information is given to an 
investigating police officer or member of the police that there is reasonable cause 
for suspecting that articles which may be material as evidence in respect of an 
offence in respect of which an accusation or complaint has been made under Art. 
14 of this Code and the offence is punishable with more than three years 
imprisonment, are concealed or lodged in any place and he has good grounds for 
believing that by reason of the delay in obtaining a search warrant such articles 
are likely to be removed. 
The interests protected under article 32 are body, premises and property of a person 
against arbitrary searches and seizures respectively. The protection of the individual’s 
person is one of the fundamental aspects of privacy, without such protection there is the 
threat of physical violence and assaults. As a rule, neither the body of a person nor the 
premises may be searched. However, this rule may be derogated when the exceptional 
conditions stated under article 32 (1) & (2) are met. Exceptionally, a police officer can 
lawfully interfere with the bodily privacy or territorial privacy of individuals as per 
article 32 of the Criminal Procedure Code in order to prevent crimes (legitimate aim of 
the interference). And hence, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia has stipulated the 
conditions under which searches and seizures are permissible in line with the FDRE 
constitution. 
Beyond bodily and territorial privacy, communications privacy can also be limited in 
accordance with the law for prevention of crime. As said above, article 26(2) of the 
FDRE constitution guarantees the right to the inviolability of one’s notes and 
correspondence (communications privacy) including postal letters, and communications 
made by means of telephone, telecommunications and electronic devices. However, this 
aspect of privacy can be intercepted in order to investigate and prosecute corruption 
offences. In this regard, Article 46 of the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and 
Rules of Evidence Proclamation of Ethiopia states: 
 36 
(1) Where it is necessary for the investigation of corruption offence, head of the 
appropriate organ, [an organ empowered to investigate and/or prosecute 
corruption offences], may order the interception of correspondence by 
telephone, telecommunications and electronic devices as well as by postal 
letters… (3) An order given in accordance with sub article (1) of this article 
shall indicate the offence which gives rise to the interception, and the duration 
of the interception, and, if it is a telephone or telecommunication, the link to be 
intercepted. Unless head of the appropriate organ decides otherwise, the 
duration of the interception may not exceed four months. 
Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (FEAC) of Ethiopia is an independent 
federal government organ which has a full mandate to investigate and prosecute 
corruption offences.74
 
 The commission can order the interception of one’s 
correspondence if it is necessary for investigation of corruption offences. The 
interception can not, however, be made for indefinite period. In the absence of 
otherwise decision by the investigating organ, the duration of interception should not 
be longer than four months. 
3.2.2.2 Civil Law 
 
In the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia, there are some provisions for protection of privacy. 
For instance regarding pictures, it is said that the photograph or the image of a person 
should not be exhibited in a public place, nor reproduced, nor offered for sale without the 
                                                 
74 Proclamation No.433/2005, the Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment, 
Negarit Gazeta, (2005), article 73(2) &(4), and Proclamation No. 434/2005, Revised Anti-Corruption 
Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence, Negarit Gazeta, (2005), article 2(3). 
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consent such person.75 Consent is a requirement to display or disclose one’s image. 
However, the consent of a person concerned may not be sought where the production of 
his image is required for justice, scientific or cultural interests, or public interests.76 
Similarly, in respect of correspondence, the Civil Code provides that “the addressee of a 
confidential letter may not divulge its contents without the consent of the author.”77
The Civil Code has also protected bodily privacy by setting out that “a person commits a 
fault where he intentionally makes contact with the person of another against the latter’s 
will.”
  In 
both cases, consent is very important. The Civil Code entitles the person concerned to 
control the reproduction of his image or the disclosure of the contents of his letter. From 
this, one can safely infer the two basic principles of data processing (data subject’s 
participation and disclosure limitation) which are enshrined in EU Data Protection 
Directive and OECD Privacy Guidelines.  
78 However, as per article 2039(1) of the Civil Code, no fault is deemed to have 
been committed where the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the plaintiff 
would object to his act. The test of reasonable expectation of privacy seems to be 
introduced in this article. For instance, a person may touch another person against the 
latter’s will in queue for public transport or in market places where the reasonable 
expectation of privacy is minimal. And the defendant may not reasonably expect the 
plaintiff would object the body contact in those places. Regarding bodily privacy, a 
person is also entitled to refuse at any time to submit himself to a medical or surgical 
examination or treatment.79
                                                 
75  Extraordinary Issue No. 2/1960, The Civil Code Proclamation of the Empire of Ethiopia, Negarit 
Gazeta, (1960), Article 27.  
 Protection of bodily privacy pertains to the preservation of an 
individual’s physical integrity. Consent to privacy invasive procedures (trespass against 
the person, forms of assaults in the medical environment) is normally required. 
76  Ibid Article 28. 
77 Ibid Article 31(1).  
78 Ibid Article 38 (1.)  
79 Ibid Article 20 (1).  
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Furthermore, the Civil Code has prohibited trespassing on the land or into the house of 
another, and taking the possession of property against the will of the lawful owner or 
possessor, without due legal authority.80 In other words, in the absence due legal 
authority, one can not enter into the house of another person or seize the property of 
another or trespass on the land of another person unless the latter has consented to that 
effect. The Civil Code further sets out that a person is at fault when he (by his words, 
writings or by any other means) acts in such a way as to make another person detestable, 
contemptible or ridiculous and to jeopardize his credit, his reputation or his future.81
At this juncture, one may wonder the remedy available for individuals whose privacy is 
violated. Depending on the nature and type of the violation, the remedy can be of two 
fold: civil and criminal. In other words, violations may give rise to both civil and criminal 
liabilities. Putting aside the criminal liability, the victim can bring an action against the 
infringer by virtue of law of extra-contractual liability. In Ethiopia, extra-contractual 
liability is mainly established based on fault, and exceptionally based on strict and 
vicarious liability.
  
82  Generally, fault is deemed to have been committed when there is a 
breach of the usual standard of good conduct by act or forbearance.83
 Apart from the test of reasonable man standard, Articles 2038-2065 of the Civil Code 
define what types of conduct constitute fault, and if a person acts or omits in violation of 
 Pursuant to article 
2030(2) of the Civil Code, the standard of good conduct is closely tied up with concept of 
prudent and diligent person who never commits an act which is bad. The defendant’s act 
is judged in reference to this reasonable man representing usual and good conduct i.e. 
what a reasonable man would have done in the same circumstances. If this reasonable 
man would have acted in the same way as the defendant, had he been placed in the shoe 
of the defendant, the latter is said to have committed no fault. Deviation from the usual 
standard of good conduct will put the defendant at fault. 
                                                 
80 Ibid Articles 2053 and 2054. 
81 Ibid Article 2044. 
82 Ibid Article 2027. 
83 Ibid Article 2030 
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one of these provisions, he will be considered as committing fault. Besides, violation of 
any specific provision of law is fault by virtue of article 2035 of the Civil Code. 
Therefore, deviation from the above discussed privacy laws (invasion of privacy) is 
tantamount to fault which may, in turn, spawn civil liability pursuant to article 2028 of 
the Civil Code (“whosoever causes damage to another by his fault shall make it good”).  
To conclude, one can bring a lawsuit based on law extra-contractual liability against 
another so long as the former sustains damage due to the latter’s privacy invasive act. 
 
3.2.2.3 Mass Media Law 
 
The FDRE constitution guarantees freedom of expression, opinion and thought under 
article 29. The freedom of expression as recognized in the constitution consists of the 
right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.84 Accordingly the public is at 
liberty to receive information about the working of the government representing them. By 
the same token, press and other mass media are entitled to gather information in the 
process of seeking ideas and disseminating them to the public. This means that the 
government is duty bound to be transparent and let its documents accessible to the press 
so long as it is for public interest. These rights can only be limited through laws guided 
by the principle that freedom of information and expression can not be limited on account 
of the content or effect of the point of view expressed.85 The legal limitation can be laid 
down for the purpose of protecting the well being of the youth, and the honour and 
reputation of individuals.86
In line with the constitutional provision, the Proclamation on Freedom of Mass Media 
and Access to Information (Mass Media Law) provides that all persons have the right to 
 
                                                 
84 FDRE Constitution, supra note 66 Article 29(2), second limb. 
85 Ibid Article 29(6). 
 
86 Ibid. 
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seek, obtain and communicate any information held by public bodies, except exempted 
information therein.87
At this juncture, it is very important to query what kind of information is considered as 
personal one, and is exempted from being disclosed. Fortunately, the Mass Media law of 
Ethiopia has clearly defined what personal information means. Pursuant to Article 2(8) of 
the Mass Media Proclamation, 
 The exempted information from disclosure is inter alia personal 
information. In this respect, article 16(1) of the Mass Media Law goes “Any public 
relation officer must reject a request for access to a record of the public body if its 
disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about third 
party, including a deceased individual who has passed away before 20 years.” Had it not 
been this provision, the personal information of a person would have been at risk in the 
course of seeking and disseminating information. However sub article 2 of the same 
article stipulates situations (including the consent of the person concerned) under which 
personal information may be disclosed.  
‘Personal information’ means information about an identifiable individual, 
including but not limited to: (a) information relating to the medical or educational 
or the academic, employment, professional or criminal history, of the individual or 
information relating financial transactions in which the individual has been 
involved; (b) information relating to the ethnic, national or social origin, age, 
pregnancy, marital status, colour, sexual orientation, physical or mental health, 
wellbeing, disability, religion, belief, conscience, culture, language or birth of the 
individual; (c)information relating to any identifying number, symbol or other 
particular assigned to the individual, the address, fingerprints or blood type of the 
individual; (d) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the individual except 
where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an award 
or a prize to be made to another individual; (e) the views or opinions of another 
individuals about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the 
                                                 
87  Proclamation No.590/2008, Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information, Negarit Gazeta, (2008), 
Article 12(1) and Article 15. 
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individual, but excluding the name of the other individual where it appears with the 
views or opinions of the other individual; (f) the views or opinions of another 
individual; or (h) the name of the individuals where it appears with other personal 
information relating to the individual or where the disclosing of the name itself 
would reveal information about the individual; but excluding information about a 
person who has passed away before 20 years. 
In short, personal information is any information about an identifiable individual. This 
provision has attempted to list examples of personal information without being 
exhaustive. To the best knowledge of this writer, it is very difficult to see a reason 
why the legislature goes to such a long list insofar as the list is illustrative. If it were to 
make the list exhaustive, it would be sensible. Unlike the definition of EU Data 
Protection Directive, this definition expressly include biological material of an 
individual when article 2 (8) (c)  refers “information relating to any identifying 
number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, the address, fingerprints 
or blood type of the individual” to be personal information. Indeed, the definition is 
broad enough to include any information about identifiable person, but is muted about 
information relating to an identified person. One may wonder at this point that what if 
the information is related to an identified person. This writer believes that if 
information about an identifiable person (who is going to be identified through the use 
of one or the combination of such information) is treated personal information, 
information about an identified person must be personal one for stronger reason. In 
this regard, the EU Data Protection Directive has made it clear by saying personal data 
means any information related to an identified or identifiable individual.88
As has expressly been stipulated under article 16 of the Mass Media Law, personal 
information held by public body should not be disclosed under the guise of access to 
the records of the latter. This article contains one of the basic principles of personal 
data processing i.e. disclosure limitation. However, its scope is limited in the sense 
  
                                                 
88 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, (1995), Article 2(a). 
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that it refers to personal information held by only public body. This provision does not 
say any thing about personal information held by private sectors. 
 
3.3 Inadequacy of Privacy Protection Laws 
 
In the preceding discussion, we have examined the relevant provisions for privacy 
protection within the purview of Ethiopian legal system. In this particular section, we 
will indulge into areas that are not provided protection by those provisions. As has 
been indicated in section 2.1, privacy has several dimensions – territorial privacy, 
bodily privacy, privacy of communications, and information privacy. The ICCPR and 
the FDRE constitution have given recognition for the right to privacy, which needs 
specific laws for its effective enforcement.  The above discussed provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, Mass Media Law and the Civil Code mainly focus on some 
aspects of privacy: bodily, territorial and communications privacy. Information 
privacy appears less protected. 
Information privacy concerns the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information. The regulation of information privacy is to protect private information 
about an individual which is not intended by the individual to make public or over 
which the individual wishes to retain control. In view of this, EU Data Protection 
Directive has enshrined the core principles for protection of personal information, 
which can be expressed in terms of lawful and fair data processing, minimality, 
purpose specification, data quality, data subject participation and control, disclosure 
limitation, information security and sensitivity.89
                                                 
89 Ibid, Articles 5-8. 
 These principles are also reflected in 
the national laws of EU countries. As seen in section 2.4, the OECD guidelines too 
have contained those basic principles which highly influence the national laws of 
member states. 
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Turning to the Ethiopian legal system, there are no laws which explicitly deal with the 
core principles of personal data processing. Nonetheless, one can safely conclude from 
the foregoing discussion that the principles of disclosure limitation and data subject 
participation (consent) are embodied in the Ethiopian privacy protection provisions. 
However, the two principles are applicable to a limited degree. For instance, the non-
disclosure principle in Mass Media law is confined to personal information held by 
public organ, not by private sectors. As has been explained in section 3.1, information 
and communication technology is growing steadfastly which in turn let a wide and 
uncontrolled personal data processing and dissemination by both public and private 
sectors. To the dismay of individual’s privacy right, the existing provisions related to 
privacy do not suffice to regulate personal data collection, processing, and flow across 
institutional as well as national boundaries. This is the reason why this writer believes 
that the personal information aspect of privacy has received little protection by the 
existing law of Ethiopia. 
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Chapter Four 
4 The Need for Privacy Law 
 
As we can understand from the previous discussion, the existing laws within the legal 
framework are not capable to protect privacy to its fullest. In other words, privacy related 
provisions incorporated in various branch of laws of the country do not suffice to provide 
protection for manifold aspects of privacy, particularly information privacy. This being 
so, this writer would like to recommend the enactment of a comprehensive piece of 
legislation for the following compelling reasons: to protect human rights, to promote e-
commerce, and to govern technological advancements. Let us see the compelling reasons 
one by one. 
4.1   Human Rights Protection 
 
States establish legally binding obligations among themselves by entering into an 
international agreement or through wide accepted state practice of a rule as customary 
international law.90 As treaties under international law, the Covenants and other human 
rights instruments create legally binding obligations for states that have ratified the 
instruments. Regarding the obligation of state parties, the ICCPR provides that every 
state party to the Covenant should respect and ensure to all individual within its territory 
the rights recognized therein91
 
. Article 2(2) of the ICCPR further stipulates that each state 
party is under obligation to enact legislation and create the framework to give effect the 
rights enshrined in the Covenant.  
                                                 
90 Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in Hurst Hannum (ed.), Guide to 
International Human Rights Practice, (2nd ed.), University of Pennsylvania Press, (1992), p.9. 
91 General Assembly Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 28, Article 2(1). 
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In the international human rights law, privacy is clearly and unequivocally established as 
a fundamental right to be protected. Accordingly, states are duty bound to respect and 
protect the right to privacy within their jurisdiction. The degree of obligations range from 
abstaining from interference with privacy to protecting individual’s right from being 
infringed by other. As a state party to ICCPR, Ethiopia must, therefore, comply with the 
international obligations undertaken at the international level. Not only should the 
country refrain from interference with privacy of individual, but also should take some 
positive measures including enacting piece of legislation for effective implementation of 
the right. Given the growth of the gathering and holding of personal information on 
computers, data banks and other devices by public authorities or private sectors, failure to 
have legislation is tantamount to non-compliance with international obligations, which 
renders human rights particularly privacy right ineffective. Information concerning a 
person's private life may reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to 
receive, process, and use it, which, in effect, threatens the privacy of individual. 
 
Apart from international obligation, Ethiopia has a national obligation to take the 
necessary measures for the effective enforcement of human rights enshrined in the FDRE 
constitution. In this connection, the constitution says “All Federal and State legislative, 
executive and judicial organs at all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to respect 
and enforce the provisions of [human rights].”92
 
 As per this provision, federal and state 
legislatives should exercise their power for the effective implementation of human rights, 
including privacy right. The inherent power of legislative organ is, obviously, to make 
laws. Accordingly, the federal and state law making organs are obliged to enact laws for 
protection of privacy as guaranteed in the constitution and in the Covenant. To put 
succinctly, the enactment of piece legislation for privacy protection is very indispensable 
to discharge international as well as national obligations owed to human rights. The main 
purpose of having such law is to protect the fundamental human rights, in particular the 
right to privacy. 
                                                 
92 FDRE Constitution, supra note 66, Article 13 (1). 
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4.2  Electronic Commerce Promotion 
 
The global economy has increasingly become dependent upon information technology 
which has enabled a growth of international communication and commerce.93 Commerce 
now requires the transfer of huge quantities of personal data, largely relating to 
employees and customers.94 Thus, personal information increasingly flows across the 
borders of different nations around the world. As pointed out in section 2.5, privacy laws 
and regulations have evolved in various nations. However, this raises two difficulties: (1) 
differing level of protection might interfere with the smooth and efficient flow of 
personal information between countries, (2) countries seeking to protect the privacy of 
their citizens must depend upon the protections accorded by other countries.95
 
 There is 
thus a need for harmonization or convergence of approaches to regulating the processing 
of personal information. 
In view of this, both the OECD Guidelines and the EU Data Protection Directive contain 
rules for trans-border data flows – the flow of information between different countries.96
 
 
The OECD guidelines 15-18 regulate trans-border data flows among member states, but 
the guidelines are silent about the flow of data outside member states. On the other hand, 
the EU Data Protection Directive regulates the transfer of data across national borders in 
two ways: letting the flow of information free within the community as indicated in 
article 1(1) of the Directive, and putting the requirement of adequacy test for transfer of 
data outside Europe as envisaged article 25 and 26 of the Directive. The EU makes the 
flow of information within the community free by increasing the level of harmonization, 
and puts pressure on other countries to adopt legislation satisfying adequate protection. 
                                                 
93 Daniel J. Solove and Marc Rotenberg, supra note 5, p.735. 
94 David Bender and Larry Ponemon, supra note 49, P. 154. 
95 Daniel J. Solove and Marc Rotenberg, supra note 5, p.735. 
96 Supra note 60, OECD Guidelines 15-18 and EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 88, Articles 25 and 
26. 
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As per article 25(1) of the EU Data Protection Directive, member states are required to 
ensure that personal data, that are undergoing processing or are intended for processing 
after transfer, are not transferred outside the EU or European Economic Area to a third 
country unless that third country has put in place adequate level of protection. As 
indicated in paragraph 2 of article 25 of the Directive, whether that third party has put in 
place adequate level of protection for personal data processing, it must be examined in 
light “all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer 
operations,” in particular the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed 
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, 
the rules of law in force both general and sectoral, the professional rules and security 
measures. 
 
Pursuant to article 26 of the Directive, where a third country fails to fulfill the 
requirement of adequate level of protection, personal information can be transferred on 
the following conditions: (1) the data subject has given unambiguous consent to the 
proposed transfer; (2) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between 
the data subject and the controller of the data, or for one of several other specific 
purposes; (3) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party; (4) 
the transfer involves data that is essentially public; (5) the transfer is necessary to the 
vital interests of the data subject; or (6) a contract is in place between data exporter and 
importer, that requires adequate safeguards by the importer. Accordingly, United States 
(whose privacy law fails to provide adequate level of protection in the eyes of EU) has 
responded to the EU Directive by putting safe harbor arrangement which provides 
adequate protection for personal data transferred from the EU. 
 
Turning to Ethiopia, the country is not an exception. The country is required to satisfy the 
adequate level of protection for transfer of personal data from Europe. Ethiopia has, 
wants to have extensive trade relations with European countries as well as other foreign 
countries. It has also attempted to privatize many sectors so that foreign investors can 
participate in the economy. The existence of appropriate and efficient law is very 
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important to regulate and promote investment. So long as the Ethiopian law is found to 
lack of adequate protection of privacy, it will encounter limits on the transfers of personal 
information. Limitations on the flow of personal information discourage investment and 
commerce. Beyond trans-border data flow, the enactment of privacy law is equally 
important to put the legal framework in place for e-commerce within the country. Thus, 
the enactment of privacy law is very essential to facilitate e-commerce (which the 
country will introduce it in the future), international trade and investment. 
  
4.3  Technological Developments Regulation 
 
The recognition of privacy as a concept worthy of distinct treatment by the law dates 
back to an article called “The Right to Privacy” in the 1890 Harvard Law Review, which 
was inspired by the rise of newspapers, photography and other technologies with the 
potential to expose people’s images and personal information to the public.97 Recently, 
fresh privacy concerns again arose as a result of technological developments, notably the 
spectacular growth of automatic data processing made possible by the computer 
revolution.98 The modern world is a time of telephoto lenses, long-range parabolic 
microphones, and mobile phone cameras, as well as other technological advances such as 
the internet that provide easy means of dissemination of information to a world wide 
audience.99
                                                 
97 Gehan Gunasekara, The ’Final’ Privacy Frontier? Regulating Trans-border Data Flows, International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol.15, No.3, Oxford University Press, (2006), p. 365. 
 These advances mean that there is now nowhere on earth that a person may 
retreat with an absolute assurance of being left alone. The public concern is focused on 
the impact of information revolution upon our lives, in particular where this interface 
impacts upon our ability to lead a private life.  
 
98 Ibid. 
99 Des Butler, A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia, an article available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MULR/2005/11.html#Heading345, visited on 26/07/2009. 
 49 
 
Currently, information and communication technologies have been increasingly 
developed in Ethiopia. Access to means of widespread publicity is now at the fingertips 
of government institutions as well as private sectors. This may in turn let public and 
private sectors to collect, process, and transfer personal data. And hence there is a need 
for law to accommodate developments in technology and changes in attitudes, practices 
and values in the society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Different authors have defined privacy differently. Privacy has been described as the 
right to be left alone, the right to exercise control over one’s personal information, limited 
accessibility, or intimacy. Nonetheless, there is no universally accepted definition of 
privacy. Defining the concept has been found complicated and a difficult task. Regardless 
the absence of a universally accepted definition of privacy, the quest and need of privacy 
is natural and a real one. The protection of privacy is very essential to safeguard 
personhood, autonomy, integrity and dignity of human being. The term should be 
understood to include all aspects of privacy, namely bodily privacy, information privacy, 
communication privacy and territorial privacy. And privacy laws should provide 
protection to every aspect of privacy. 
 
Recently, privacy laws in many jurisdictions have emerged in order to protect privacy. 
Indeed, the evolution of privacy laws has been catalyzed by various factors. The first 
being, most major human rights instruments have recognized privacy as a fundamental 
human right. The vast majority of countries of the world are parties to those human rights 
documents which in turn require the contracting states to ensure that their domestic legal 
systems provide adequate protection against interference with privacy. Accordingly, 
despite differing level of protection accorded and cultural differences, the notion of 
privacy has already been introduced in many countries legal system. Secondly, the 
continued development of information technology has had a huge impact upon the right 
to privacy. In other words, the advancement of information technologies has increasingly 
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threatened the privacy of individuals, for the technologies have made the collection, 
processing and transfer of personal information easier. Conspicuously, most information 
technologies are privacy invasive. This being so, many countries have begun to regulate 
the adverse effect of information technologies on individual’s privacy. The advancement 
of information technologies is, therefore, the other factor for the emergence of privacy 
laws such as Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data Protection, EU Data 
Protection Directive, national privacy laws of different countries and OECD Privacy 
Guidelines. In shaping the national laws of various countries, the EU Data Protection 
Directive and the OECD Privacy Guidelines have played a great role throughout the 
world. 
 
As a party to the ICCPR, Ethiopia has undertaken an international obligation for the 
protection of privacy. In line with this obligation, the country has enshrined the right to 
privacy in its constitution. Despite the constitutional guarantee of privacy and the 
steadfast development of information technologies in the country, there is lack of specific 
piece of legislation for the full enforcement of the right. As discussed, we are, however, 
able to find some relevant provisions of different branches of the law for protection of 
privacy. And yet, those provisions are not sufficient enough to protect the 
multidimensional concept of privacy. For instance, the existing law does not sufficiently 
regulate how personal information can be collected, processed and transferred. They are 
also very limited in the scope of protection. 
 
The need for privacy law is imperative. The reasons being: first, Ethiopia has 
internationally consented to protect and promote human rights recognized by 
international agreements. Over and above, the country has constitutionally recognized the 
right to privacy. And hence particular law is a must to implement the right incorporated 
in general terms. Secondly, the country has conducted international trade with foreign 
countries, which require the transfer of personal information. Knowing the absence of 
protection to personal information, foreign countries may withhold the flow of personal 
data, and thereby obstruct trade relations. Moreover, sooner or later, the country will 
certainly introduce e-payment which involves personal information. The enactment of 
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privacy law is, therefore, indispensable to foster international trade as well as to lay a 
legal foundation for e-commerce. Thirdly, the information technologies, which affect 
society in many ways, need to be regulated. The law may lag behind the technological 
advancements. This can seldom be inevitable, for there are difficult times for legislators 
to make laws before hand and regulate certain technological developments. In any event, 
the law should not remain behind indefinitely. The law should be dynamic to regulate 
technologies, and innovation. And hence, Ethiopia needs to promulgate privacy laws to 
cope up with the development of information technologies. 
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